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EQUITY AS A CONCEPT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
I. TiEm JURIDICAL CHARACTER OF ARBITRATION
One of the most important problems which can engage the
attention of the student of international arbitration and
adjudication is that of the juridical basis of the arbitral process.
Is it the duty of an arbitrator, to decide according to law? Or
may he decide according to equity? Are there any limits on his
discretion in the decision of international controversies?
The problem of the legal character of arbitral awards was
perhaps most vividly in the public eye during the period of agi-
tation for a permanent international court of justice. The pro-
ponents of the proposed court outdid themselves in picturing the
weaknesses of settlement by arbitration, by way of creating a
demand for the court. They properly emphasized the value of
a court sitting permanently, made up of the representatives of
the whole world. But they also frequently asserted that its
decisions were to be based on law, in favorable contrast to the
awards of arbitral tribunals. James Brown Scott was perhaps
the leading protagonist of the view that arbitral awards are non-
judicial in character.1  Wehberg, who had previously held an
opposite opinion, after an examination of the cases became a
proponent of Scott's view.2 Baldwin asserts that while adjudi-
cation is necessarily based on law, arbitration is based on law
only in the discretion of the arbitrators. 3 In his instructions
to the American delegates to the Second Hague Conference,
Elihu Root, then Secretary of State, pointed out the tendencies
of arbitrators to negotiate like diplomats. 4 'Marburg states that
the aim of arbitration is to compose differences and that the
"'It is equally elemental that the judge is bound by his oath to
administer the law of the land, whereas the arbitrator is free to decide
the controversy according to the terms of the submission, the equity
of the case or the dictates of his own conscience. The distinction
between the award of an arbitrator and a judgment of a court is thus
sufficiently clear, the arbitrator looks to what is fair, the judge to
what is law." Peace Conference, I, 189. See also, Schlief, 14 Archiy
des Offentlichen Rechts 260, 264, (1899), "Die Petersburger Kundge-
bungen und die Volkerrechtswissenschaft;" Philip Marshall Brown, 51
Revue de Droit International et de Legislation Comparee 317, (1924),
"Arbitrage et Justice."
2Problem of a Permanent Court of International TJustice, 14.
"Judicial Bettlement of International Disputes, No. 5, 34.
"Scott, Hague Conferences of 1899 and 1907, 1, 440.
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spirit of compromise which prevails as a result is opposed to
the development of permanent rules of law.5 Politis contends
that arbitration is of a dual nature, being both judicial and
pacific in purpose. The Hague Court of Arbitration has inclined
more to the pacific function, as shown in the Casablanca, Vene-
zuela' Preference, Boutres of Muscat, Atlantic Fisheries, and
Savarkar cases.0 Dennis maintains that in actual practice,
arbitral tribunals tend to compromise.7 Alpheus H. Snow con-
tends that Article 37 of the Hague Convention providing for
decisions "on the basis of respect for law" is indefinite and binds
the tribunal to nothing. He urged that the next Hague Con-
ference should consider the matter of limiting arbitral tribunals.
Lieber was of the view that arbitrators have a broad power,
especially when the arbitral agreement is not definite.9  He
asserts that there is no tacit understanding of the legal profession
as to the nature of the arbitrator's discretion. "The extent of
the authority and consequent duty of umpires varies under dif-
ferent circumstances. In some cases he must strictly limit him-
self to a decision according to law and equity of those points in
which the parties differ. . . . At times, however, and
especially when nothing distinct has been expressed by the ap-
pointing parties, the authority and duty of the umpire includes
the conciliatory arbitrament. . . . I shall give my decision in
the present case as an umpire possessed of full authority, in-
cluding that of the conciliatory arbitrament, as I have called it."
The better view, however, seems to be that arbitration is
based on law.'0 The leading authorities seem generally to have
'Judicial Settlement of International Disputes, No. 1, 30.
:Judicial Settlement of International Disputes, No. 6, pp. 9-15.
11 Columbia Law Review 493. "Compromise-The Great Defect
of Arbitration."
"60 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 153, 158. "Legal
Limitations of Arbitral Tribunals."
'2 Moore, International Arbitrations, 1300, note 2, Case of Marcos
Schaben v. Mexico.
10 The arbitrator in the Walfisch arbitration between Great Britain
and Germany says:
"Considering that both questions must be solved in conformity with
the principles and positive rules of public international law, and, where
they fail, in conformity with the general principles of law, since neither
the said Agreement of 1890 nor the supplementary Declaration of Berlin
the 30th of January, 1909, in any ways authorize the arbitrator to base
his decision on other rules, and it is notorious, according to constant
theory and practice, that such authority cannot be presumed .
Martens N. R. G., 3rd Ser., VI, 429.
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taken this view. At the present time the trend is unmistakably
toward this attitude. John Bassett Moore emphatically re-
pudiates the view that arbitration is based on compromise.:1
Ralston believes that the chief distinction between courts of arbi-
tration and the Permanent Court of International Justice lies
not in the rules controlling the court, but in the manner of selec-
tion of the Judges, their fixity in office, and their independence
of the parties. The arbitrators may have compromised in cer-
tain cases where there was no applicable law, but this was un-
avoidable.12  Edwin . Dickinson is'of the view that it is the
duty of the arbitrators to apply the law, and also that arbitrators
have generally done so.13 Borchard after analyzing hundreds
of arbitrations in the reports of Moore, Ralston, and La
Fontaine, adopts the views of Moore. 14  Hudson argues that
arbitration is not inherently less judicial than is adjudication.15
Hyde also regards arbitration as a judicial process.16 Garner
says that "arbitration tribunals have in fact generally shown as
great respect for the well-settled rules of international law as
national courts have shown. "17
Almost innumerable other authorities have arrived at the
same conclusion. Writing in 1874, Goldschmidt pointed out that
arbitrators generally decide according to international law.' s
Lammasch states that where positive rules of law exist, the arbi-
trator must turn to them.' 9  States may agree that a tribunal
shall decide exclusively according to equity, but such a decision
does not follow of itself, where there is no such agreement.
Nippold believes that the arbitrator should apply law, but that
he may resort to equity in doubtful cases.20 Castberg says that
generally "international tribunals are bound to found their de-
See the chapter by Moore at pp. 165-167 in Walsh, The History
of International Relations.
The Law and Procedure of International Tribunals, pp. XXXVI-
XXXVII.
'As expressed in conversation.
144 Illinois Law Quarterly, 67-73.
" The Permanent Court of International Justice, 113.
"International Law, II, 112, note 2; see also, sec. 559.
ITRecent Developments in International Law, 524-5.
'"6 Revue de Droit International et de Legislation coimparee, 421,
443, "Projet de Reglement Pour Tribunaux Arbitraux Internatonaux."
"Die Lehre von der Schiedsgerichtsbarkeit in ihrem ganzen
lUmfange, II, 175-177.
2Die Portbildung des Verfahrens in VoNcerrechtlichen, Streitig-
keiten, 190-195.
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cisions on positive international law. '"21 In the absence of posi-
tive international law they may apply the general principles
drawn from the rules of international law, as established by the
science of international law, or may seek a just solution in the
spirit of international law. Magyary points out that the
formerly asserted opinion that the arbitrator is called upon for
a decision -according to equity.by the inherent nature of his
functions is now commonly rejected.22 Like Ralston he be-
lieves that the distinguishing character of the World Court is
its permanence and its independence of the will of the parties,
and not the character of its decisions. In fact the World Court
may itself be compelled to render decisions based on equity and
expediency in the absence of law, and must therefore not be
prized too highly.
In one of the best recent discussions of the subject, Hedges
maintains that the only real difference between arbitration and
adjudication is-that "in arbitration the arbitrators are appointed
ad hoc by the parties, whereas in pure judicial settlement there
must be a permanent court. In both the process is essentially a
legal one." 2 3 He concludes "that plans for the further develop-
ment of international arbitration should proceed on the assump-
tion that in its modern application at least it rests on a juridical
basis." Within the last two years Lauterpacht has strongly
reiterated the view that arbitration is strictly legal.24 Balch
points out that there has been an unfortunate tendency in recent
years "to confound International Arbitration with Municipal
Arbtration and to minimize if not to deny entirely the judicial
quality of arbitration as a component part of the Law of
Nations." 25  He quotes Pufendorf, Kluber, Rolin-Jaequemyns,
Renault, and Westlake as upholding the view that arbitration
is not based on compromise. The decisions of national courts
often contain elements of compromise, but this is not a defect,
since decision according to strict law is impossible in many
cases. L. H. Woolsey believes that the differences between arbi-
52 Revue de Droii international et de Legislation comparee, 155,
169-170, "Le Competence des Tribunaux Internationaux."
Die Internationale Schiedsgerichtsbarkeit irm Volkerbunde, 87-S9.
"British Yearbook of International Law, (1926), 110, 119.
Private Law Sources and Analogies of International Law, see. 28.
2115 Columbia Law Review, 590 et seq; 662, et seq. "Arbitration as
a Term of International Law."
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tration and judicial settlement have been overstated. 26 Writing
in 1927, he concludes that on the whole "there would seem to
be little, if any, valid objection to, or any real disadvantages in,
arbitration as a method of settling differences between nations
as compared with a strictly judicial proceeding." 'When the
United States submitted the Orinoco Steamship Company case to
the Hague Tribunal, Secretary of State Knox asserted that
arbitration is a strictly legal process. 27 "Indeed the United
States has taken even more advanced ground and has said that,
inasmuch as arbitration is thus, as stated, a judicial rather than
a diplomatic procedure, the judgment of the arbitration court
must conform to the principles of law and equity involved and
controlling, and that where, in its opinion, it is wholly clear and
evident that a decision essentially fails so to conform, such de-
cision should be open to an international judicial revision."
The discussions of the Advisory Committee of Jurists who
drew up the Statute of the World Court also throw light on the
subject. Descamps asserted that there are three fundamental
differences between arbitration and adjudication: first, in arbi-
tration temporary judges are elected, while in adjudication a
permanent judge is provided; second, in arbitration the rules
to be followed depend more or less on the choice of the parties,
while in adjudication more or less stable and universally recog-
nized principles are followed; third, arbitration is voluntary,
while adjudication is compulsory.28 But, he pointed out, the
power to render a conciliatory award was exceptional, and not
an essential characteristic of arbitration. Moreover, equity is
used to fil in the gaps in adjudication as well as in arbitration.
Ricci-Busatti said that it was impossible to define precisely the
difference between arbitration and adjudication.29 In many
instances the arbitrator and the judge have the same functions
and the same origin. The court could not therefore be founded
on such distinctions. There could be no fundamental difference
between arbitration and adjudication since it was theoretically
"21 A. J. J. L. 113.
' "The Spirit and Purpose of American Diplomacy," an address
delivered at the Commencement Exercises of the University of Penn-
sylvania, June 15, 1910, p. 9.
Advisory Committee of Jurists. Permanent Court of International
Justice. Proces Verbau,. June 16-July 24, 1920, pp. 44-48.
Ibid., 106-107.
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and practically impossible to create a court similar to the
national courts of the countries, since this presupposed a
superior authority from which it derives its authority, and since
in the present status of international relations this authority does
not exist.3 0
Descamps supported the views of Ricci-Busatti. With refer-
ence to potential competence there was little to choose between
the old and the new courts. Questions of law were considered by
both tribunals; but questions not so strictly legal could be sub-
mitted to them. In most cases both courts decided according to
law. The real difference was in the organization and method of
operation, and not in the material law to be applied. More-
over, he called the committee's attention to the fact that Article
12 of the Covenant (before amended distinguished only between
disputes capable of settlement by arbitration, and cases not sub-
mitted for arbitration, the latter of which were to go to the
League Council. Construing Articles 12 and 14 of the Covenant,
the latter of which provides for the establishment of a world
court, he argued that if they were reconciled ac.ording to the
common rules of legislative interpretation, the result would be
that the two courts would have the same jurisdiction and would
differ only in their organization. It is perhaps proper to say
in criticism of Descamps' view that he fails to distinguish be-
tween the questions of jurisdiction and the material law applic-
able in the decision of disputes. Loder, later the first president
of the Court, submitted a memorandum pointing out that the
difference between arbitration and adjudication is not to be
found in the nature of the decision rendered.31 In both. law
and equity may be protected. The real distinction is that in
arbitration the agreement of the opposing party is necessary
before the case can be heard; he must concur both in defining the
point at issue as well as in the choice of judges. Graphically
speaking, arbitration "means combat before a combat."
IL THE Colomp m oF ARBImATION
The discussion up to this point has indicated that it is the
duty of arbitrators to decide in accordance with law. This
20 Ibid., 177-187.
Ibid., 247. See also, 9 Bu etin De L'Institut Intermediaire Inter
nationaZ 257 (1923), La Difference Entre L'Arbitrage International et
La Justice Internationale."
EQUITY AS A CONCEPT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
would seem to be a rule of international law based on custom
and practice. The question then becomes: according to what
law? The rules of law governing an arbitral tribunal are some-
times set out in a general arbitration treaty negotiated between
two nations. As a rule, however, a special agreement is drawn
for the concrete case or series of cases to be adjusted at a given
period. This is true where there is no general treaty of arbitra-
tion, or where the case is of such nature as to demand other rules
than those provided in such a treaty. This special agreement is
generally known as a compromis.32  The compromis is always
written and is generally established in the form of a regular
treaty, though sometimes by exchange of notes. Besides setting
out the rules to be applied, the compromis generally provides for
the arbitral settlement of a concrete case, the recognition and
carrying out of the award, the arbitral procedure or process,
the method of selecting the arbitrators, the time, place and
award of the tribunal, and the period of revision of the sentence.
The compromis in short is the legal instrument which gives
life to the tribunal and governs the legal basis of its award.33
The part of the compromis of chief importance in connec-
tion with this discussion is of course that providing the govern-
ing rules of law. Examination of the compromis of arbitral
awards reveals that their contents fall roughly speaking into
four classes: first, those providing that certain specially desig-
nated rules shall govern; second, those providing that the award
shall be according to international law, or the principles of in-
ternational law; third, those which make no provision as to the
governing law; and fourth, those providing that international
law and equity, or simply equity or absolute equity shall
govern.3
4
2Lammasch, op. cit., 97; Merignhac, L'Arbitrage Internationa7,
sec. 148-149.
't More says that it is the compromis which "forms the judidical
basis of the jurisdiction of the arbitrator, which fixes the limits of his
powers in his character of judge." Consequently the arbitrator should
always "heed the rule of Roman law: arbiter nil extra eorpromissum
fac-repotest." 17 Revue Generale de droit international public 225
240, "La Sentence Arbitrale de President de la Republique Dans Le
Conflict De Limites Entre La Bolivie et Le Perou." See also, Nipold,
op. cit. 191.
3A detailed analysis of the contents of compramis is to be found
in the award of the Cayuga Indians Case. Report of Fred K. Nielsen,
Agent and Counsel for the United States. American and British Oaims
Arbitration under the Special Agreement concluded between the United
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Compromis laying down spedific rules of law to govern the
award have been relatively infrequent. Perhaps the most not-
able example of such an agreement is that of the Alabama Claims
case, in which three rules were laid down governing the liability
of Great Britain for violations of her neutrality during the Civil
War. Great Britain expressly stated that she did not thereby
recognize these rules as rules of international law, and that they
were to govern that case alone. The statement of the rules prac-
tically settled the case and very nearly reduced the Geneva
Tribunal to a board for the assessment of damages. As a matter
of fact, the rules eventually were embodied in accepted inter-
national law, thus demonstrating the importance of arbitral
agreement. In the Venezuela Preferential Claims arbitration
before the old Hague Court Venezuela expressly recognized the
justice of the claims of the blockading powers. Likewise in the
British Guiana dispute between Great Britain and Venezuela
in 1897 a fifty year period was laid down as the rule of prescrip-
tion.3 5 Several of the Mixed Claims Commissions set up under
the Treaties of Peace after the late war are bound under the
treaties to decide according to rules which impose a much greater
liability on the losers than would the ordinary principles of in-
ternational law. There is no rule of international law against
treaty provisions which ignore or disregard the general principles
of international law as between contracting states. 36 Third
states, however, would not be bound, and the decisions of such
commissions would not build up a body of case-law applicable
States and Great Britain. August 18, 1920, p. 307, et req. Kamarowsky
asserts that one must recognize among the "less satisfactory provisions
of treaties those as to the principles which should guide commissions
in the examination of cases and in their settlement." Le Tribunal In-
ternational, 178.
"5 In case the rules provided are not adequate or are obscure, the
tribunal may fill the gap by applying the rules of international law.
Merignhac says that a certain measure of equity also may be applied.
Op. cit., see. 294. In the Alabama case the rules provided left open the
question of indirect damages, and failed to clarify the meaning of "due
diligence."
""The terms of the treaty fix and limit Germany's obligation to
pay, and the Commission is not concerned with enquiring whether the
act for which she has accepted responsibility was legal dr illegal as
measured by rules of international law. It is probable that a large per-
centage of the financial obligations imposed by said paragraph 9 would
not arise under the rules of international law, but are terms imposed
by the victors as one of the conditions of peace." Umpire Parker,
Opinions of the Mixed Claims Commission, United States and Germany,
79.
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to later cases. At the most they may possibly furnish a starting
point in the development of customary law.
One not especially familiar with arbitral practice might
readily suppose that most arbitral agreements would provide for
settlement according to international law, or in somewhat broader
terms, according to the "principles of international law."
Surprisingly few agreements rest on so simple a basis, however.
Several explanations are possible. The nations may not desire
a strictly legal settlement. Or they may consider international
law as being too incomplete a legal system to afford a determina-
tion of all cases submitted. Or it may simply be a case of legal
surplusage. Perhaps a true- explanation at the present date is
the long continued practice in using additional bases.
In some cases the parties provide that the tribunal shall
apply the rules of international law existing at the time the trans-
actions complained of arose.3 7 Such a principle would generally
be implied without an express provision on the subject. Where
there has been a sweeping moral change, such as the abolition
of slavery, after the transaction occurred, perhaps the tribunal
would not apply the old law. In the case of treaties, the clause.
rebus sic stantibus may be implied. In one case, the parties in
their eagerness to secure a strictly legal decision provided that
the award must be made in "strict obedience to the principles of
international law." 38  The Central American Court of Justice
Convention provided for the settlement of questions of law in
cases arising, by the application of international law. Where the
comprornis is of this class it would seem that little question
could arise as to what law is to govern. Non-judicial considera-
tions such ,as compromise, expediency, and general justice
could not enter in as dominant factors. Under the term "in-
ternational law" would be included, as a minimum, the two large -
categories of custom and treaties. If a rigid interpretation were
adopted, it might be argued that when the claimant state cannot
find a rule in these sources its claim must be rejected. The bet-
ter view, however, would seem to be that the court might in the
case of clear gaps in the law resort to the common legal prin-
ciples of the states, to the decisions of international tribunals,
'THaiti-United States (1884), Act IV, 23 St. L. 785.
8Bolivia-Peru (1901), Art VIII, 3 A. J. I. L. Supp. 378.
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and to the writings of publicists. Analogy and equity as found
in the sources last named might be applied.39
The third type of compromis is that which is silent as to the
law to be applied. There is a -very large number of such treaties
in existence. 40 It is perhaps with this type of agreement in mind
that most of the writers have expressed their opinions as to the
legal bases of arbitral awards. The concensus of opinion seems
to be that the arbitrators must look to international law. The
Hague Tribunal in the Norwegian Shipping Claims case laid
down the rule that the tribunal must apply international law as
found in treaties and custom, and the practice of judges in other
international tribunals.41 Ralston,42 Aferignhac, 43 and Scott.44
all assert that th6 decision must be founded on international law.
Oppenheim says: "In default of any express provision, it must
be presumed that the award is to be given according to principles
of International Law, or if there are none applicable, according
to rules of equity.''14 Hall says that the arbitrators proceed
according to the rules of "civil law" (doubtless meaning by this
municipal law), unless, as sometimes happens, they agree to be
bound by special rules framed by themselves. 46 Lamnasch lays
down the rule followed in the Norwegian Shipping Claims case.
4 7
Politis points out that arbitrators may be given unusual powers
as when by the express terms of the compromis they are to act
as amiable compositeurs and compromise the dispute, or when
they are empowered not only to settle an existing dispute but
"Merignhac suggests that resort is first had to general International
law as found in general treaties, custom, the decisions of international
and national tribunals on analogous questions, and the writings of
publicists. In the absence of these the tribunal will look to special
international law as found in particular treaties and the principles of
the municilal law. If both of these sources fail, the tribunal must
then resort to what it believes is the most equitable. Op. cit., see 297-
298.
4 Out of 228 arbitration treaties between the American nations
listed by Manning about 140 of them are silent as to the applicable law.
17 A. J. I. L., 384.
2Op. cit., sec. 61.
' Op. cit., sec. 304.
"Hague Court Reports, XXI.
"International Law, 4th ed. II, sec. 15.
"A Treatise on, International Law, 373.
"Die Rechskraft Internationaler Schiedsspruche, 41.
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to regulate the future interests of the parties.
48 But in. the
absence of such provisions the arbitrator must decide according
to international law. If the law is insufficient, the arbitrator
should refuse to decide, or should ask for the powers of an
amiable compwsiteur.
The fourth class of compromis is that in which equity is
made a basis of decision. This category both now and in the
past has always included an exceedingly large proportion of
arbitral agreements. 49 The common formula is decision accord-
ing to "international law and equity," or "justice and equity."
Provision is also sometimes made for settlement "according to
international law, equity, and treaty provisions." A more
limited group of Latin-American agreements direct judgment
"upon a basis of absolute equity, without regard to objections
of a technical character or of the provisions of local legislation."
Some compromis in effect'make the arbitrator little more than
an amiable compositeur by providing that his award shall be
"just and expedient," while some specifically provide that he
shall act "as an amiable compositeur." It was asserted in the
Cayuga Indians case that some discrimination has been shown in
employing or not employing equity as a basis for decision. It is
used quite regularly in general claims arbitration agreements,
but less frequently where specific questions are referred.
50 The
writer must confess to considerable doubt, however, as to whether
the framers of compromis have in most cases actually contem-
plated any essential distinctions in the juridical bases of awards.
III. EQun: AS A CONCEPT OF MU ICPAL LAw
The purpose of this discussion is to analyze the meaning of
the term "equity" in'a compromis of the class just discussed.
The word was used as far back as 1794, in the Jay Treaty.
"La Justice internationale, 80-85. In 1875 the Institute of Inter-
national Law adopted in its proposed arbitral code of procedure Article
18 providing: "The arbitral tribunal shall judge according to the rules
of international law, unless the compromis imposes on it different rules,
or submits the decision to the free appreciation of the arbitrators."
Anuaire de L'Istitut de Droit International, 1877, p. 131.
"A large number of treaties containing equity clauses are set out
in the case of the Cayuga Indians in Nielsen's Report, 307.
*"Nielsen's Report, p. 807. In illustration the tribunal cites the
treaty of Ghent as to the Northeastern Boundary of Maine, the Fur
Seal Arbitration Convention of 1892, the Alaskan Boundary Convention
of 1903, and the North Atlantic Coast Fisheries Arbitration, none of
which permits the application of equity.
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"Absolute equity" was the ground for decision in the Vene-
zuelan arbitration cases of 1903. The provision for equity as a
basis of the decisions by the Prize Court in Article VII was one
of the chief causes of the failure of the Prize Court Convention.
The Hague Court passed on the meaning of the term in the
Orinoco case. The notable arbitration treaties of 1911 proposed
by President Taft covering disputes justiciable at law or equity
were attacked partly on the ground of the indefiniteness of the
meaning of the latter word. The Hague Tribunal gave some at-
tention to the notion of equity in the Norwegian Shipping
Claims case. An extensive discussion by both the arbitration
commission and the agents appears in the recent Cayuga Indians
case.
The concept of equity is not a new one. Like so many other
ideas it harks back to Aristotle. "The justice which supple-
ments the written law is equity." 51 If the point has escaped the
notice of the lawmaker, it is contrary to his intention; on the
other hand if the rule cannot possibly be stated so as to cover
all cases, it is consistent with his intention. Apparently Aristotle
regards both methods of supplementing the law as altogether
proper and as embraced within the one term "equity." "Equity
consists too in making allowance for human infirmities, in re-
garding the legislator rather. than the law, the intention of the
legislator rather than his language, the purpose of an act rather
than the act itself and the whole rather than the part, in con-
sidering not so much what is a person's character at a particular
moment as what it has invariably or usually been, in remem-
bering benefits more than injuries, and benefits received more
than benefits conferred, in suffering injustice patiently, in con-
senting to settle disputes by agreement rather than by a trial
of strength, in wishing to resort to arbitration rather than law;
an arbitrator always takes the equitable, whereas the juror takes
the legal view of a case, and indeed the object with which arbi-
tration was devised was to ensure the triumph of equity."
Aristotle is rather cynical as to the use of equity in the set-
tlement of a dispute.52 If the written law is adverse to one's
case, appeal must be made "to the universal law and principles
Rhhetoric, Book I; ch. 13.
12Ibid, Book I, ch. 15, see also, AristotZe's Ethics, Book X, ch. 14
(Welldon).
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of equity as expressing justice of a higher order." It must be
argued that the oath taken by the "juror" to decide "according
to the best of my judgment" does not bind him to the letter of
the law. It must be claimed that equity and universal law,
since they conform to nature, are eternal, while written laws
often are. altered. Finally, it must be alleged that the rigid
construction of the law is sham justice, and not genuine and
beneficent like real justice. On the other hand, if the written
law is in one's favor, one must allege that the oath does not per-
mit deviation from the law, and is worded as it is merely to
exonerate the judge if he honestly mistakes the law, or that the
absolute good is not to be sought, but merely the good of the
individual; or that the law is futile if it is not to be followed.
Last of all, it must be urged that confidence should be put in the
law-maker as knowing what he is about and what is best for the
case.
The two great legal systems with which equity is generally-
associated are the Roman law and the law of England and the
United States. It seems extremely doubful, however, that there
was a definite body of law in the Roman system known as
equity.5 3 "Aequitas" seems rather to have been a quality of
reasonableness and fair dealing not confined: to any given
branch of the law. The Roman law was divided into the jus
civile based on the Twelve Tables and the praetorian law based
on the edicts of th praetors. The jus gentium was equitable in
nature and was found chiefly in the edicts of the praetor
peregrinus, who had jurisdiction of cases involving aliens. But
the praetor urbanus on many occasions applied rules which were
equitable in their nature, so that equity was not confined merely
I "I doubt whether aequitas is ever clearly used by the Roman
jurists to indicate simply a department of law. It is a mode or quality
of administration of justice, by the Praetor, but was not confined even
within the letter of the edict for the time being." Clark, Practical
Jurisprudence, 367. "It was not a fixed single notion. It was a com-
plex of new ideas by which law was changed as conditions changed.
Its affinity with the notion of ius naturale tends to an identification.
Paul says that aequitas is a characteristic of ius naturale and the ex-
pression naturalis aequitas is not uncommon." Buckland, A Text-
book of Roman Law, 55. See also Krueger, Geschichte der Quellen und
Literatur des Romischen Rechts, (1888), 123-126. The most detailed
discussion is to be found in the monumental four volume work of
Voigt, Die Lehre vomn jus naturale,, aequum et bonum und jus gentium.
der Romer (1856). See also, Buckland, Equity in Roman Law; Maine,
Ancient Law, ch. 2, 3; Pound, 27 Harvard. Law Review, 195, "The End
of Law as Developed in Legal Rules and Doctrines."
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to the jus gentium as applied by the praetor peregrinus. The
jus civile and the pretorian law were ultimately fused into one.
Today in Italy there is only one body of law, and similarly the
other countries of the world which have adopted the Roman law,
have no separate system of equity. To a Continental lawyer
equity is therefore synonymous witlh reasonableness, fair dealing,
morality, or a mitigation of the strict letter of the law.5 4
Thus it seems that the only legal system in the world having
a highly developed group of more or less crystallized rules
known by the term "equity" is that of England and the United
States. Equity at first in that system seems not to have been
separated from the general body of the law, and some writers
assert that equity is as old as the common law. 5 The early
character of English equity is well summed up in the oft quoted
remarks of Selden: "Equity is a roguish thing; for law we have
a measure, know what to trust to. Equity is according to the
conscience of him that is chancellor, and as that is larger or nar-
rower, so is equity. 'Tis all one, as if they should make the
standard for the measure we call a foot a chancellor's foot, what
an uncertain measure this would be. One chancellor has a long
foot, another a short foot, a third an indifferent foot; 'tis the
same thing in the chancellor's conscience.' ""
Gradually the cases began to pile up and it was seen that
many of them involved similar principles. The chancellors
51 Kantorowicz in an elaborate classification of a complete legal sys-
tem regards equity as "nascent implicit law." 28 Columbia Law Re-
view 679, 696. "Legal Science-A Summary of Its Methodology." Un-
der his classification law is divided into two large classes: formal, that
is, law which has undergone and completed' a definite process of formu-
lation or integration; and "free law", or law that has not completed
these processes. Free law in turn is divided into explicit and implicit
law, the former being explicitly declared to be law, and the latter "a
rule which is recognizable as law by significant actions." "Nascent
law" is law that would be formal law, if it had undergone and com-
pleted the process, instead of having only entered into it, as contrasted
with desired law, which is law which those who apply it desire to be-
come formal law.
Nascent implicit law includes the "rules to which statutes and
judicial decisions allude, if they speak of 'boni mores', the habits of a
bonus pater familias, 'good faith and trust,' 'nature of things,'
.exigencies of life', 'equity', (if not recognized as a part of the formal
law), 'justice', 'public convenience', etc. These concepts are mere
'standards' (Blanketsbegriffe), which cannot be applied before having
been filled up by substantive rules."
"131 Harvard Law Review 834, Barbour, "Some Aspects of Fif-
teenth Century Chancery."
r, Table Talk, 46.
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began to examine the precedents. Lord Eldon gave a strong
impetus to the synthesis of the principles previously laid down.
"The doctrines of this court ought to be well settled and made
as uniform almost as those of the common law, laying down
fixed principles, but taking care that they are to be applied
according to the circumstances of each case. I cannot agree
that the doctrines of this court are to be changed with each suc-
ceeding judge. Nothing would inflict on me greater pain, in
quitting this place, than the recollection that I had done any-
thing to justify the reproach that the equity of this court varies
like the Chancellor's foot.'' 7 5 Since Lord Eldon the principles
of equity have taken on a greater rigidity, but an historical
examination will show that there have been many considerable
changes in the rules. In the United States there was in the nine-
teenth century a strong tendency to limit the discretion of the
courts in applying equity. Pomeroy says: "It is very certain
that no court of chancery jurisdiction would at the present day
consciously and intentionally attempt to correct the rigor of
the law or to supply its defects by deciding contrary to its settled
rules, in any manner, to any extent, or under any circumstances
beyond the already settled principles of equity jurispru-
dence." 5 s  During recent years it is perhaps true to say that
there has been some relaxation in the rigidity of the system. But
that there is a real core of underlying principles cannot success-
fully be controverted. Decisions are not made simply on the
basis of the views of the individual judge as to reasonableness
and morality. The term "equity" as understood by English and
American lawyers has a comparatively definite and technical
connotation.
IV EQUITY IN INTEINATIONAL LAw
A. ViEws OF TRE PUBLICISTS.
Many of the concepts of international law are derived from
the municipal law of the nations of the world. Having examined
the meaning of equity in the various legal systems, one is now
prepared to analyze it as a term of international law. The
method employed will be first a comparison of the views of the
1Gee v. Pritchard (1818), Swanton's Reports, 402, 414.
"Equity Jurisprudence, sec. 46, 4th ed.
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leading publicists and then a study of the awards of arbitral
tribunals.
The long usage of the term "equity" in international re-
lations is shown by the fact fhat it was employed by Grotius.5 9
In considering the subject of arbitration, he says, we must first
find out whether the arbitrator is to act as a judge or as an
umpire. He refers to the view of Seneca that the judge is con-
fined to the application of the rules of law, while the arbitrator
"can soften law and justice by kindness and mercy." He also
quotes Aristotle's opinion that "the arbiter looks to equity, the
judge to law." It should be noted, however, that Seneca and
Aristotle had reference to arbitrators in private law, and that
from a modern point of view, Grotius is confusing the arbitrator
at international law, wh9 must apply law, with the arbitrator at
private law, who is not so bound.60 "In this ease equity does not
mean, as elsewhere, that part of justice which interprets the law
by its general tendency and real purpose, (for this part is also
committed to the judge) ; but it means everything which is better
done than not done, even extraneous to the rules of justice prop-
erly so called." This sort of arbitration is common in private
law, and was recommended by Saint Paul to the Christians.
But in a doubtful case, there is no presumption of such author-
ity. This is particularly true in a dispute between sovereign
states, since the latter having no common judge, are presumed to
have bound the arbitrator by the same rules as govern the office
of a judge.
The views of modern publicists are more valuable than those
of Grotius inasmuch as arbitration since his time has assumed
an increasingly juridical character. In 1911 President Taft sub-
mitted to the Senate arbitration treaties with Great Britain and
France providing for the arbitration of all international differ-
ences "justiciable in their nature by reason of being susceptible
of decision by the applibation of the principles of law or equity."
Mr. Taft pointed out that since the term is used in the treaty
with France as well as in that with England it cannot be given
" De Jure BeMli et Pacis, III, ch. 20, sec. 47, Whewell edition. For
the view of Pufendorf, sec. De Jure Naturae et Gentium, V, ch. 13, 95.
"I The judicial discretion of the arbitrators of the Middle Ages was
very broad. The instances of eompromis providing legal principles to
govern the arbitrators in the decision of cases were very rare. Nova-
covitch, Les Compromis et les Arbitrages Intervationaux Dub XII ail. XV
Siecle, 28-29, 76, 83-84.
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the technical meaning of Anglo-American law. 61 Yet much the
same meaning has been ascribed to the term by many nations.
"Equity has ameliorated and mitigated the severity of the law.
The two words used together, therefore, were intended to com-
prehend all the rules of international law affecting the rights
and duties of nations towards each other which are not merely
rules of comity, .but are positive and may be enforced by judicial
action." Knox, Secretary of State at the thhe these treaties
were drawn up, maintained that disputes were justiciable "where
a rule or decision may be found in accepted principles of law,"
or could be decided "by the accepted principles of justice. '"62
The majority report of the Senate Committee which considered
the treaties says: "We are obliged, therefore, to construe
'equity' in its broad and universal acceptance as that which is
equally right and just to all concerned; as the application of the
-dictates of good conscience to the settlement of controversies." 6 3
Senator Rayner asserted that the term meant simply the whole
of the principles of the legal system of both nations.6 4 It did
not cover such subjects as immigration, state debts, and the
Monroe Doctrine. Senator McCumber contended that it meant
the equity of the Anglo-American law.6 5 Senator Lodge argued
that there was no authoritative definition of the phrase "law or
equity" in international law.66
William C. Dennis, agent for the United States in several
arbitration cases, points out that the phrase "law and equity"
by its long dating back to Jay's treaty has acquired in interna-
tional law a meaning similar in kind to that of "due process of
law" in American Constitutional law.67 The phrase does not
give a court unlimited discretion. Like "due process" the
phrase has been defined as to certain basic concepts, and at-the
same time it permits of a broad treatment by exclusion and in-
The United States and Peace, 106-108.
12 Judicial Settlement, II, 170.
S. Der. 98, 62nd Congress, 1st Sess. pp. 4-5.
6' bid., pp. 19-20.
Cong. Rec., Vol. 48, p. 1065.
"S. Doc. 353, 62nd Cong., 2nd Sess., pp. 11-12.
615 A. J. L L. 614-620. "The Arbitration Treaties and the Senate
Amendments." In 60 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 388,
398-399, "The Pending Arbitration Treaty With Great Britain," Dennis
says that "Whenever it has been suggested that this expression gave to
the arbitrators unlimited discretionary authority, this suggestion has
been negatived." Since "justice and equity" have a narrow meaning,
that of "law or equity" is a fortiori still narrower.
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clusion. Reinsch maintains that international equity is much
broader in scope than English equity.6 "It involves the appli-
cation of general standards of justice, and the determination of
what in good faith ought to be performed." In international
arbitration the principles of legality have a tendency to widen
out "into interpretations which are based upon ideas of equity,
justice, and fair dealing." As international law is still in its
infancy, the tribunal must be permitted to resort to equity to
advance its development. "Legality is the center, the core, the
ultimate criterion of judicature: to establish it in the wisest and
broadest manner there will be necessary a constant resort to
principles of equity."
Scott, in criticism of the equity clause in Article VII of the
Prize Court Convention alleges that it makes the court a legis-
lative body and allows it to develop and modify international
law.69 He also uses the term to cover a blending of the private
law principles of the various systems of law. "For the purpose
of the Permanent Court of Arbitration municipal law must be
internationalized. In this case, and in this case only, can the
judgment be equitable in any international sense, and the judg-
ment so formed will be based upon international equity as well
as international law. ' 70  Scott also uses the term in a very gen-
eric sense to cover the principles governing the decision of arbi-
tral bodies.7 1 "With the Permanent Court of Arbitration at the
Hague to decide political questions according to the dictates of
political equity, with an international Court of Justice at the
Hague to decide according to law, and with conferences meeting
at regular intervals elsewhere, there would be a court of justice,
a court of equity, and a lawmaking body adequate to the needs
of the nations as they present themselves from time to time."
Philip Marshall Brown, referring to the treaties of 1911, says:
"Equity may mean anything that judges deem just." 72 P. B.
Potter asserts that when the arbitral agreement provides for an
award "according to the principles of international law and
5 A. J. L L., 604-612, "The Concept of Legality in International
Arbitration."
95 A. J. I. L., 302, 314. "The International Court of Prize."
'0 Conference of 1907, II, 323-324.
71 Sovereign States and Suits before Arbitral Tribunals and Courts
of Justice, 247.
International Society, 87. See also, 51 Revue de Droit Inter-
national et de Legislation Comparee, 317, 326.
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equity," the arbitrator may do "very much as he pleases.' 'T
Garner says that the broad interpretation of equity as meaning
general principles of justice "is in accord with the opinion of the
authorities.' '7- John Bassett Mloore appears to reject the view
that equity is equivalent to morality.7 5 Lieber says: "Nations
have often practiced, heaven be thanked, international charity,
but it hardly appears in the law of nations or international
justice and equity." 76 Baldwin points out that equity in the 1911
arbitration treaties does not mean English equity.7 7 "France,
and the world generally, know equity, as that which is fair and
just, though perhaps not sanctioned or required by strict and
technical rules of ordinary law. It is the jus aegui et boni of
the Roman law."
Mlost of the English authorities have expressed their opin-
ions on the meaning of equity in connection with the Prize Court
Convention. The Convention was severely criticized on the
ground that equity is wholly indeterminate and rests on the in-
dividual, subjective views of the judges. The late Lord Finlay,
a member of the World Court, stated in a speech in the British
Parliament that the proposed Prize Court "is at liberty to decide
according to its own pleasure, according to its views of the gen-
eral principles of justice and equity, without any guidance from
any code of law agreed upon between the nations affected, on
one matter whi~h is vital to this country. Can there be im-
agined any point in which we are more vitally interested than
the question of the conversion of merchantmen on the high seas
into armed cruisers of a hostile power? The most elementary
principles of international law require that such conversion, shall
take place only within the territorial waters of the powers which
"3An Introduction to the Study of International Organization, 212-
214, 247-248.
4 British Yearbook of International Law, 19234924, p. 159, at 160.
71 Umpire Lieber, as a member of the Mexican Claims Commission,
once recommended a decision awarding damages to a widow who had
no legal claim, on charitable grounds. He took oath to decide "accord-
ing to public law, justice and equity." Moore suggests that such an
award would have been improper. 2 Moore, International Arbitrations,
1300, note 2. Moore was also of the view that the 1911 arbitration
treaties intended to settle questions justiciable at law or equity did not
cover political questions. 71 Independent 344, (1911), The Peace
Treaties."
" Leses case, 2 Moore, International Arbitrations, 1300, note 2.
I11nternational Conciliation, No. 48, p. 33.
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the vessel will represent on the high seas. We endeavored to
arrive at an agreement on this point. We found that our views
were hopelessly divergent and no agreement whatever as to the
conditions under which conversion might take place was arrived
at, and yet we rush into this convention leaving it to this court,
composed without any guidance on this point, to decide at its
pleasure whether such conversion is lawful or not. This is an
act of madness."8s
Ernest Jelf, an English judge, is inclined to agree with
Taft's view of the meaning of equity.79 "I am not sure what he
means by 'equity.' I do not think he means what the judges of
our Chancery Division would mean by the word. Perhaps he
means what Aristotle meant ....... Aristotle says:
'And this is the nature of the equitable-it is a correction of the
law where it fails through generality! In other words 'equity'
is that which the parties who framed the law would have in-
cluded had they foreseen the exact case If this is what Mr.
Taft means, we can agree with him for 'equity' is merely the
interpreting what is still a consentement des nations (as Vattel
would say) according to the intention of the parties. But if by
'equity' M-1r. Taft means morality, I should like to enter a caveat
against the arguinent thereby suggested."
The French publicists have given the term a very broad
meaning, going further than most writers. Renault, who pre-
sented the Prize Court Convention to the Second Hague Con-
ference, said that the equity clause meant that the court was to
"create the law."° The situation would be like that in the early
private law when the courts made the law at the very time they
were called upon to apply and construe it. The judges would
fill up the gaps in international law until the governments un-
dertook to codify it. The court would develop the law of evi-
dence and procedure as well as the substantive law.
Hansard, Parliamentary Debates for 1911, Vol. 32, pp. 1694-1695.
Atherley-Jones says that the court "is a legislative body; because one
of the provisions of the treaty is that if there is no provision in the
treaty which provides for a case brought before it, the court has to
deal with the question according to general principles of justice and
equity. What does that mean? It means nothing less than this, that
the court is able to legislate itself . . . . This court has no restraint
put upon it except its own sense of right and wrong." Ibid, p. 1603.
" Grotius Sgociety 59, 65. "Justiciable Disputes."
02 A. J. 1. L. 831.
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One of the most frequently cited publicists on this question
is Merignahae. "The formula which seems really precise, is
that which leads us to say that international law is applied with
equity." 8' A compromis providing for a decision according to
justice and equity is a "vague formula," leaving the arbitrator
"an absolute liberty."8 2 "Nothing is broader than the field of
equity" 8 3. He may decide "according to his personal con-
science." He ought, however, conform as much as possible to
the principles of international law, "mitige, le cas echeant, par
1 equite." Otherwise he will go astray, since his personal ex-
perience could not lead to as certain consequences as those ap-
proved by a long international practice and custom.
Weiss, a late member of the World Court, appears to follow
Aferignhac. 84 He asserts that an arbitrator, who is authorized
to decide according to law and equity, is thereby appointed an
amiable compositeur. Where express rules are provided for the
arbitrator, he cannot decide "according to the promptings of his
conscience, that is to say, according to equity." 8 5 Politis main-
tains that international law is made up of three categories: con-
ventional law, customary law, and general principles. These
general principles are those of justice and equity.8 6 Arbitrators
should not apply equity unless they are authorized to do so, on
the ground that the parties would have directed its application
if they so desired. When, however, the compromis authorizes
equity as a basis of decision, the arbitrator may resort to it
even when positive rules of law exist. On the other hand, where
the compromis does not contain such a clause, equity can be em-
ployed only to fill a clear gap in the law. When the law does
not exist or is obscure, the arbitrator "must refer the case back
to the parties, to ask them to allow him to decide according to
equity or as an amiable composteur."' 87 Otherwise the award is
in danger of not being carried out.
One of the most careful students of the law applied by ar-
bitral tribunals was the Austrian Lannasch. He is of the opin-
ML'Arbitrage International, see. 303.
ThirZ, see. 305.
"Ibid, sec. 304.
"Revue generaZe de droit international public (1910), 114,
"L'Arbitrage De 1909 Entre La Bolivie et le Perou."'
"ITbi, 120.
La Justice Internationale, 82.
I bid, 84-85.
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ion that where the compromis makes equity one of the grounds
of decision, the arbitrator, must, unless he is authorized to act as
an amiable compositeur, decide according to legal rules.8 s "He
may not unquestionably correct the law governing between the
parties according to his subjective views of equity, but he may
and should fill up the gaps of the law according to equity, that is
in the spirit of the law, according to legal analogy." It is one
of the tasks of legal science to develop this legal analogy. But
this' science must be in unity with positive law and its spirit,
and not based on the personal inclinations of the authors. The
admission of legal analogy will cause many subjective moments,
but this is unavoidable in the present incomplete state of inter-
national law. Judgments based on too subjective considerations
may be guarded against by having a group of arbitrators, this
group preferably to represent different legal systems. Lam-
maseh suggests that in the 1911 treaty between United States
and Great Britain equity may be understood in its technical
chancery meaning 8 9  He rejects the view of Merignhae that
the phrase "justice and equity" results in only a moral obliga-
tion to apply international law. Where a positive rule exists,
the arbitrator is legally as well as morally bound to follow it.
There is a distinction between the use of equity to fill up the
gaps and as a means of changing the existing law. The arbitra-
tor acts judicially since he uses equity only as a subsidiary
source of the law. The Peace Congress which met at Antwerp
in 1894 went too far in the recognition of equity when it pro-
posed that "arbitrators should make a constant appeal to
equity as well in the interpretation as in the application of prin-
ciples and statutes." Under such a plan, equity would be rec-
ognized as a factor in the correction of fixed rules of law, and
at the same time the permanent character of the award would be
Die Lehre von der Schiedsgerichtsbarkeit in-ihrem ganzen Urn-
fange, 180-181.
• 8Die Rechtskraft Internationaer Schiedsspruche, 49-51. Lam-
masch also says: "States by agreeing that the arbitrator shall decide
according to law and equity empower him in the meaning of Kant, to
consider those imponderabilities which the ordinary judge of a court
existing within a State would not be permitted to consider." Op. cit.
50. "Consequently the subjectivity, the discretion of the judge, which
are more and more prevailing in modern criminal cases, and even in
civil cases, has in international relations a very special meaning." Op-
cit., 50-51.
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taken away and the judgment placed wholly in the discretion of
the judge.
The Hungarian Magyary emphasizes the conciliatory as-
pects of equity.00 The old Hague Court has been criticized, he
says, for proceeding "more according to equity and to settle the
dispute." The former opinion that an arbitrator is called upon
only for a decision "according to equity or for an adjustment of
the dispute" is now commonly rejected. On account of the gaps
in international law many cases must be decided according to
"equity and expediency." Erich rejects the limited scope al-
lowed to equity by Lamynasch. 91 "Against this consideration
of Lammasch it may be objected that according to it no differ-
ence would appear between the finding of the law and the appli-
cation of equity; the reference to equity as basis of the decision
would if it were to be understood in this way have no particular
meaning, since it follows from the nature of international law,
that the judge in many cases is compelled to "find" the law.
Although there may be no sharp boundaries 'between this func-
tion of the arbitrator and the decision according to equity, yet
the two conceptions are, as above remarked, to be distinguished,
and it must be admitted that the above indicated reference to
equity gives him an increased potentiality to mitigate the sever-
ities of the jus strictum, and to extend his free examination
somewhat further; it would be impossible to set down here the
boundaries by distinct limits." The view of Kohler, that'a
compromis making equity a basis of decision has no significance,
is criticized as hardly intelligible.
Fiore, eminent Italian publicist, makes equity equivalent
to conscience.92 He points out that if an arbitrator has been
invested with jurisdiction to decide a dispute according to
equity, he cannot be reproached if he decides "d'apres sa con-
science eclairee." Alvarez, a leading South American publicist,
points out that arbitrators frequently state in their decisions that
they are proceeding according to equity without explaining
what they mean by that term. 3  It is applied where general
SODie intern ationale Schiedsgericltsbarkceit in Voflkerbunde.
"Probleme der internationalen Organisation, 7, note 1.
"117 Reveu Generae' de droit international public, 225, 245.
Anzilotti appears to regard equity as based on compromise, Corso Di
Diritto Internationale, 64.
3_La Codification Du Droit Internaiona7, 118.
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principles of law and justice are lacking. "Today, equity may
be regarded as the solution which good sense indicates as the
most fitting for each specific case; it is of a special nature not
subject to general rules." Consequently no legal doctrines as
to the subject involved may be extracted from the sentences of
tribunals which apply equity. Equity is ancient, its conception
and role varying according to the epoch. Kamarowsky asserts
that the use of "equity" as a term of the compromis clearly
shows the inadequacy of the nomenclature of the principles
which govern tribunals.94  "The conceptions of justice, of
aequitas often vary not only among different peoples, but even
among the individuals of the same nation." Strisower says
with reference to the 1911 arbitration treaties providing for ar-
bitration of suits justicable at "law or equity, that one can
hardly find a boundary from the objective nature of the dis-
putes raised from this wording." 95 The Norwegian Castberg is
of the view that where the compromis provides for a decision ac-
cording to "justice and equity," the tribunal should apply ex-
isting international law, and supply the gaps in it by the appli-
cation of the principles of equity in the spirit of international
law.96 But where "absolute equity" is the sole basis, it may dis-
regard the law. Poh asserts that the equity clause of the Prize
Court Convention gives the proposed court the power to make
law more or less at its discretion.9 7 Schucking says concerning
the clause: "The existence of a modern natural law for interna-
tional law has thereby found an official international recogni-
tion. This 'modern natural law' is obviously no longer in the
meaning of Hugo Grotius a 'Normalrecht' which has signifi-
cance for all times and all peoples, but contains principles
which are drawn from the concrete needs.'"'9 Nippold in-
dorses the views of Merignhac, thus accepting the broad mean-
ing of equity.99
"Le Tribunal Internationa, 178-9.
" Die Krieg -nd. die Volkerreehtsordnung, 63, note.
52 Revue de Droit International et de Legislation Comparee, 155,
169.
"Deutsche Prisengerichtsbarkeit. A very valuable discussion of the
objections to the equity clause is found at pp. 163-192.
9 'Die Organisation der Welt in den Staatsrechtlichen Abhandlungen,
538.
" Die Fortbildung des Verahrens in Volkerrechtliehen Streitig-
keiten, 195.
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The German Bulmerineq points out that equity- must be re-
sorted to in three types of situations.1 00 On some occasions dis-
putes not of an international law nature are submitted. In the
second place, although the dispute is of a juridical character, the
necessary legal principles may be lacking. Equity is also used
to establish the amount of damages due to the claimant state.
The principles of equity are principles of international law in
the view of Bulemrincq, despite their non-recognition by the
writers of such countries as the United States and England. On
any other view many disputes would have to go unsettled.
Kohler maintains that a provision for equity as one of the bases
of settlement of a dispute has no significance. 1°1 "It has been
said that when the arbitral award is not based on the sources of
law indicated in the arbitral agreement, that excess results in
nullity; but this view must be entirely rejected. It may happen,
that it is stated in the arbitral agreements, that the arbitrator
should decide more according to equity than according to law;
or that he must base his decision on the latter or the former
source of law. But such agreements have no meaning. It is
obvious that every tribunal, including the arbitral body must
decide according to law, and must decide what the law is, con-
sidering all the sources of law, which are revelant, in a complete
manner."
One of the most recently expressed views on the subject is
that of Lauterpacht.102 "It would be a grave mistake to as-
sume that in all those cases in which, in contradistinction to
rules of international law proper, rules of 'justice,' of 'equity;
and of 'general principles of law' are resorted to, the field of
judicial settlement is abandoned and a settlement on a non-
judicial basis adopted .. ..... Rules of equity are rules of
law both in municipal law and in international arbitration."
Such rules generally turn out to be rules of private law of the
nations. The rules of customary and conventional international
law being regarded as inadequate, the parties to arbitral agree-
ments stipulate for equity as an additional basis of decision. 10 3
Die Staatsstreitigkeiten und ihre Entscheidung oh3e Krieg, see.
11; Holtzendorff, Handbuch des Volkerrechts, IV, 42.
1n 7 Zeitsehrift fur Volerrecht 113, 116. "Die Stellung des Haager
Schiedshofes."
0 Private Law Bources and Analogies of International Law, sec. 28.
ID3 id, 298-299. The discussions of the Advisory Committee of
Jurists who' drew up the World Court Statute throw some light on the
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"There exists a customary rule of international law to the effect
that 'general principles of law,' 'justice,' and 'equity' should,
in addition to and apart from customs and treaties, be treated
as binding upon international tribunals. These sources, which
are shown by the practice of international tribunals to connote
legal rules proper and not precepts ex aequo et bono, are for the
most part identical with generally recognized principles of pri-
vate law."
A comparative analysis of the views of the leading public-
ists of the nations of the world clearly indicates that the pre-
ponderant view is that equity when used as a basis of interna-
tional arbitration permits the tribunal to exercise a very broad
discretion. Equity is not confined to mere analogy or interpre-
tation, but is made identical with morality, conscience, and the
subjective views of the arbitral body. Taft and Dennis are
almost the only American jurists who have given the word a
narrow meaning. Scott, Garner, and almost all other publicists
who have expressed an opinion adopt the broader meaning. The
leading English publicists almost unanimously take a similar
matter. Descamps pointed out that while it may be the "duty of the
judge to apply the law where it exists, we mus4 not forget that equity
is, in international as well as in national law, a necessary complement
of positive law. The first duty of a judge is to render a sentence and
he is often obliged by the circumstances to render a sentence based on
equity and to use the suggestions of his own conscience and of his rea-
son in order to supply the deficiency of positive law, and the many gaps
and imperfections in the law of nations are not of a nature to lessen
the difficulties of the task." Advisory Committee of Jurists. Permanent
Court of International Justice. Proces Verbaux, 44-4S. Ricci-Busatti
remarks: "Equity is the very essence of law, which is merely its
form." Ibid, 106-107. Root pointed out that the vagueness of the term
"equity" had resulted in the failure of the Prize Court Convention.
Ibid., 2S6, 308-324. Hagerup proposed that the Court could only resort
to equity when authorized to do so by the parties. Equity "was a very
vague conception and was not always in harmony with justice."
Descamps proposed that the court should decide according to "objective
justice", a justice not identical with the subjective opinions of the
judges but one accepted by the civilized nations. "I should say equity,
if I did not fear that a misunderstanding might occur, owing to the
various meanings put upon that word." Ricci-Busatti asserted that
the proposed third clause of the sources of law tq be applied referring
to "the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations" did
not have the effect of making equity a basis of decision. Ibid, 331-346.
Lord Phillimore called attention to the technical English meaning of
equity, and asserted that the judge would be given too much liberty if
the broader meaning was adopted. De Lapadelle "did not know these
principles; equity varied from case to case; generally speaking, care
must be taken not to employ words with a special meaning; justice
includes equity."
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view. The French authorities, notably Mlerignhae, who has
been much quoted, and Weiss and Politis maintain that an
equity clause not only permits the tribunal to flu gaps in the law,
but to ignore positive rules of international law. The German
publicists in practically all instances assert that the broad mean-
ing is the correct one. Virtually the only Continental jurist who
maintains the strict view is LTanimasch, who confines equity to
filling the gaps and rejects all departures from positive rules.
But even his view is rather ambiguous, as there is no agreement
as to what a gap is. The rationale of the views of the majority
appears to be that unless a comparatively broad meaning be
given to the term "equity" its use in the comnpromis is mere
surplusage.
(To be concluded in January issue).
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